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2The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, 
the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as 
temporally shifted towards their effects (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). This 
temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and 
partly on inferential "postdictive" explanations of sensory effects of action. We 
investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could explain both 
these aspects of causal experience. We studied the time at which people perceived a 
simple manual action to occur, when statistical contingency indicated a causal 
relation between action and effect, and when no such relation was indicated. Both 
predictive and inferential “postdictive” shifts in the time of action depended on 
strong contingency between action and effect. The experience of agency involves a 
process of causal learning based on statistical contingency.
Introduction
The evolution of human intelligence has allowed not just deeper understanding of the 
world, but a greater capacity to act on it. Such operant actions imply the ability to know 
that one is performing an action, and to represent its consequences (Dickinson & 
Balleine, 2000).  Research on the epistemic content and conscious experience of action 
has identified two distinct processes underlying this ability.
According to ideomotor theories (e.g. James, 1890), actions are internally represented by 
reference to their external consequences. On this view, making an operant action 
involves a prediction of the action goal, an idea supported by recent models of 
3computational motor control (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Berti et al, 2006).  
Alternatively, the conscious experience of operant action may be inferred from sensory 
evidence (Wegner, 2002).  In particular, spatial and temporal correlations between 
thoughts, physical movement, and external events may lead to us to infer that we have 
caused an external event.
Voluntary actions have strong effects on the subjective passage of time (Haggard, Clark, 
& Kalogeras, 2002).  Temporal effects provide a common measure allowing the 
predictive and inferential contributions to experience of action to be compared directly.  
When a voluntary action, but not an involuntary movement, is followed by an external 
event, people perceive the action as shifted in time towards its effect, and the effect as 
shifted earlier in time towards the action that caused it (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 
2002).  This ‘intentional binding’ involves a predictive element, because omitting the 
effect does not prevent the shift in perceived time of action, as long as the probability of 
an effect given an action is sufficiently high (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It also involves 
an inferential “postdictive” element, because the tone’s occurrence shifts the perceived 
time of action, even when tone probability is low (Moore & Haggard, 2008).
This suggests that the human mind builds internal models of action-effect relations, 
which determine the experience of action.  Here, we investigate whether rules thought to 
govern causal learning in animals might also underlie the experience of agency in 
humans. Contingency is an index of the causal relation between events, and predicts 
patterns of operant learning in animals (Hammond, 1980).  Contingency is defined here 
4as the probability of an effect (E) given an action (A), minus the probability of E in the 
absence of A.  This index is known as ∆p (Allan, 1980):
∆p = P(E|A) – P(E|~A)
Where ∆p > 0 the effect is more probable in the presence than in the absence of action. 
Conversely, where ∆p < 0 the effect is less probable in the presence than in the absence 
of action. Contingency underlies performance of goal-directed action and explicit causal 
judgements (Shanks & Dickinson, 1991), but its role in conscious experience of action 
itself has not been investigated. The ∆p measure represents the statistical relation 
between actions and their effects. To calculate this relation, one needs to take into 
account what happens in both the presence and absence of voluntary action.  Traditional 
epistemology holds that humans know about their own voluntary actions directly, and in 
a self-intimating way (Descartes, 1641/1979; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). On 
this view, consciousness of action is a corollary of the motor processes engaged during 
action programming.  In contrast, if ∆p influences action awareness, this would suggest 
that the experience of any individual action depends on a causal model built up through 
extensive background knowledge acquired during both the presence and absence of 
voluntary movement.  
We performed an experiment to assess whether the conscious experience of action 
depended on the background contextual understanding of regularities in the external 
world, as expressed by ∆p, or only on immediate processing in the motor system. If 
5background contextual understanding contributes to action experience, then conditions 
with high ∆p should induce strong binding. Conversely, if immediate processing of the 
motor system alone determines action experience, then binding should be insensitive to 
changes in ∆p. 
Method
Participants
38 participants (21 Female; mean age of 26 years) took part in the experiment, which 
lasted approximately 1 hour. 
Procedure
Participants chose on each trial whether or not to press a key with their right index finger.  
The element of choice was included because computing ∆p requires trials with and 
without actions. They viewed a rotating clock hand (period 2560 ms, see Libet, Gleason, 
Wright, & Pearl, 1983), and used this to judge the time of their actions (Wundt, 1908).  If 
they decided to press, they did so at a time of their choosing within the first revolution of 
a clock hand. If they decided not to press they simply remained still until the end of the 
trial. At the end of the trial participants entered the clock time at which they pressed the 
key, or a dummy value if they had not pressed. Participants were asked to try to ensure 
that roughly half of the trials involved key presses.
A tone could also occur on each trial.  If the participant acted, a tone could follow 250 ms 
later.  A tone could also occur if they did not act.  In this case, it occurred at a random 
6time within the second revolution of the clock hand.  The probability of the tone given 
the action and the probability of the tone in the absence of action both varied across 
experimental conditions (see Table 1 for details).
Table 1. Mixed factorial design used in the study.
Between subjects factor
Low tone-probability 
group
High tone-probability 
group
Within subjects 
factor
Contingent
∆p = 0.5
P(T|A) = 0.5
P(T|~A) = 0
P(T|A) = 0.75
P(T|~A) = 0.25
Non-contingent
∆p = 0
P(T|A) = 0.5
P(T|~A) = 0.5
P(T|A) = 0.75
P(T|~A) = 0.75
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two tone-probability groups (19 
participants in each). For the low tone-probability group, the probability of the tone in the 
presence of action was 0.5. For the high tone-probability group, probability of the tone in 
the presence of action was 0.75. Both groups performed two experimental conditions.  In 
the contingent condition ∆p was 0.5, and in the non-contingent condition ∆p was 0 (Table 
1).  Thus, although the groups differed in terms of the probability of the tone given 
action, the manipulation of contingency defined by ∆p was equal in both (see Figure 1 for 
details of trial structure in each condition).
7Figure 1. Trial types and structure for each level of the experimental design.
Within each condition, trials in which the participant decided to press the key were coded 
as ‘action only’ or ‘action + tone’.  By analysing these separately we estimated the 
predictive and the postdictive inferential components of the conscious experience of 
action.  If an action is not followed by a tone, but the probability of tone given action is 
high, the experience of action may be influenced by the prediction that the tone might
occur (Moore & Haggard, 2008).  Conversely, if any particular action is followed by a 
tone, action experience may be retrospectively altered by occurrence of the tone. This 
8postdictive inferential process would be absent on trials where the tone does not occur.
We investigated the sensitivity of both predictive and inferential processes to 
contingency, by independently manipulating the probability of tones given action and the 
probability of tones given no action.
Participants in each tone-probability group completed 3 blocks of 40 trials each in the 
contingent condition and 3 blocks in the non-contingent condition.  Ordering of 
contingent/non-contingent blocks was randomised for each participant. Participants also
completed two baseline blocks of 20 trials each, at the start and end of the session.  In 
baseline blocks, participants pressed the key at a time of their choosing within the first 
revolution of the clock hand.  Participants pressed the key on every trial, and there were 
no tones. The baseline conditions control for individual differences in timing judgements. 
To determine the binding effect between actions and tones, each participant’s average 
error in judging the time of action in the baseline condition was subtracted from their 
average error in each experimental condition. A positive value indicates a shift in the 
experience of action towards the following tone. 
On those trials where actions were followed by tones, we predicted a shift in the 
awareness of action towards the tone. To isolate purely postdictive inferential 
components of action experience, we focus on ‘action + tone’ trials in the low tone 
probability group, because the low tone probability reduces the risk of confounds due to 
prediction (Moore & Haggard 2008). If background contextual knowledge affects this 
postdictive inferential component of action experience, this shift should be greater in this 
9low tone probability group where ∆p is high, since high ∆p values provide strong 
evidence of a causal link between action and tone.
In the high tone-probability group only, we expected an additional predictive shift in the 
experience of action towards the tone. This should occur even on those ‘action only’ 
trials where actions were not followed by tones. If this predictive process also depends on 
background contextual understanding, then the predictive shift should also be greater in 
the contingent condition, when ∆p was high.
Results
The overall percentage of trials where participants pressed the key was 62.4%. 
Baseline judgements (see supplementary information) for each group were compared 
before and after the experiment using 2x2 ANOVA.  Baseline judgements were earlier 
after the experiment than before (F1, 36) = 5.73, p= .022). Baseline judgements were 
earlier in the high tone probability group than in the Low tone probability group (F(1, 36) 
= 4.74, p = .036).  Since these main effects did not interact (F(1, 36) = 1.35, p = .253), the 
pre and post baseline judgements were simply averaged.
Mean binding effects for actions are shown in Table 2 In the low tone-probability group, 
a shift in the experience of action towards the tone was only found in contingent blocks, 
and only for ‘action + tone’ trials.  No shift was found for ‘action only’ trials, confirming 
that experience of action was not based on predicting the tone in this group of 
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participants. Conversely, in the high tone-probability group, a delay in the awareness of 
action was found on both ‘action only’ and ‘action + tone’.  This confirms that their 
experience of action involved predicting the effects of action.  To identify the 
contribution of contingency (∆p) to inferential and predictive components of action 
experience respectively, we subtracted the shifts in the non-contingent condition for each 
subject from their shift in the contingent condition.  This gives a direct measure of the 
effect on action experience of a 0.5 increase in ∆p, achieved only by varying the number 
of trials with tones in the absence of action.  The contingency effects are shown in Figure 
2 (see also, Table 2).
Table 2. Timing judgments for experimental conditions. Mean shift in action experience 
towards tone in ms (SE across participants).
Trial type
Shift in action 
awareness (ms): 
Non contingent 
condition (∆p = 0)
Shift in action 
awareness (ms): 
Contingent 
condition (∆p = 0.5 )
Mean contingency-
dependent shift in 
action awareness 
(ms)
Tone-Probability Group
Low tone-probability Action only -4 (7) -8 (7) -4 (7)
Action + tone -5 (8) 8 (8) +13 (5)
High tone-probability Action only 7 (9) 22 (7) +15 (7)
Action + tone 13 (8) 18 (8) +5 (5)
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The effects of contingency on action experience were analysed using Tone-probability 
group (high vs. low) as a between-subjects factor, and Trial type (‘Action Only’ vs. 
‘Action + Tone’) as a within-subject factor.  There were no significant main effects of 
Tone-probability group, F(1, 36)= .52, p = .47,  or Trial type, F(1, 36) = .51, p = .48.  
However, these factors interacted significantly F(1, 36) = 6.31, p = .017. This arose 
because greater contingency increased binding in the low tone-probability group only on 
those trials when the tone actually occurred (‘action + tone’: t(18) = 3.18, p = .005 ), but 
not on those ‘action only’ trials where no tone occurred: t(18) = -.49, p = .63).  That is, 
the postdictive inference-based shift in action experience of action due to the tone 
occurring was boosted by contingency.
Conversely, in the High tone-probability group greater contingency increased binding on 
those trials where the tone was predictable but did not in fact occur (contingency effect 
for ‘action only’ trials t(18) = 2.16, p = .045). This shift in action experience must be due 
to prediction of the tone rather than a retrospective inference, since no tone actually 
occurred.  Thus, the predictive component of action experience is also sensitive to 
contingency. Interestingly, contingency had a smaller and non-significant effect on shift 
in action experience on trials when the tone actually occurred (‘action + tone’: t(18) = 
.89, p = .39).
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Figure 2. Effects of contingency on shifts in the experience of action (ms) for each tone-
probability group, and for ‘action only’ and ‘action + tone’ trial types.  Bars show standard 
error across subjects.
Discussion
This study systematically manipulated the contingency between voluntary actions and 
their effects, by varying the probability of a tone occurring in the absence of action.  We 
also systematically assessed the contributions of prediction and postdictive inference to 
the experience of action, by measuring the shift in the subjective time of an action 
towards a subsequent tone in groups of participants for whom the probability of a tone 
following an action was either high or low.  We show that both predictive and inferential 
components of action experience are sensitive to contingency, in the sense of ∆p.
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The importance of contingency in inferential causal learning is well known: contingency 
underlies operant behaviour in animals (Hammond, 1980), facilitation of reaction times 
by prior action-effect learning in humans (Elsner and Hommel, 2004), and also explicit 
causal judgements (Shanks & Dickinson, 1991). Therefore, an influence of ∆p on the 
inferential contribution to action experience might be expected. In contrast, the role of 
general contingency in predictive modulation of action experience is more striking. This 
result is at variance with purely motor theories of action awareness (Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 2002; Berti et al. 2006). Significantly, we show that events entirely independent 
of the motor system have a strong influence on the experience of action. In particular, the 
occurrence of tones on trials where subjects had themselves chosen to make no action at 
all nevertheless influenced the subjective experience of action on other trials where they 
had decided to act. These trials in which subjects chose not to act carried information 
about the background probability of the tone in the absence of action. Our results show 
that subjects internalised this information, and that it influenced the subjective experience 
of their actions on trials with action. Purely motor theories (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 
2002) link action awareness to predictions based on motor control signals occurring 
during action, and cannot easily explain this role of background context.
We suggest that the experience of action is not solely a result of direct conscious access 
to signals within the motor system. Rather, subjects form a causal model of the statistical 
relation between action and tone, which then structures their experience of their own 
action. Contingency learning makes a very general contribution, not only to causal 
knowledge, but also to consciousness. We averaged our estimates across several trials 
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because of the high variability of human timing performance. Therefore, we could not 
measure the time-course of the learning process, but we can infer that causal learning 
occurs based on our contingency effects.
Our result does not prove that motor signals make no contribution to conscious 
experience of action. Indeed, a conscious urge to act can be generated by direct 
stimulation of motor areas in the absence of overt movement (Fried et al, 1991), and a 
conscious experience of being about to act can occur even when action itself is withheld 
(Libet et al., 1983; Brass & Haggard, 2007). Rather, motoric contributions to the 
conscious experience of action may be embedded in a wider interpretative process that 
also includes background knowledge about external events.
The intentional binding paradigm offers a new measure of conscious experience of 
action, and specifically its relation to contingency. Previous research in this area referred 
to a ‘causal impression’ (Michotte, 1963), i.e., a directly-perceived feature of causal 
events.  Our approach focuses on how experience of effects modulates the experience of 
the action that causes those effects.  It therefore analyses the internal structure of causal 
relations in a way that impressionistic approaches are unable to do.
More generally, these findings clarify the relation between subjective time and causality. 
Hume (1739/1978) argued that the experience of when events happen underlies the 
perceived causal relation between them.  Recent empirical research confirms this idea 
(Lagnado & Sloman, 2006). We show that this relation also works in the reverse
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direction.  The causal relations that we extract from the statistical regularities of our 
environment can determine the time at which we perceive individual events to occur, at 
least in the case of voluntary actions. We show that contingency modulates not just the 
perceived relation between action and effect, but the temporal perception of action itself.  
Our results further emphasize the intimate relationship between time perception and 
causality (Michotte, 1963), and between action and time perception (Yarrow et al., 2001).
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